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  Abstract 
This thesis studies the prevalence and survival of spinoff entrants in Portugal from 1987 
to 2008. Information on worker flows is used to identify them at a population level, 
providing evidence on other operations such as mergers and acquisitions. We show that 
the number of spinoffs has been increasing at a higher rate than other entrants of 
comparable size. Studying the determinants of their exit suggests that the most important 
predictor is whether the spinoff was motivated by the failure of the parent firm. The effect 
of industry specific knowledge and previous experience of the founders from working 










Entry plays a significant role in economic activity, with new firms being responsible for 
exploring business opportunities and providing an incentive for incumbent firms to 
innovate to stay in the market. This thesis focuses on one particular kind of entrant, one 
that is created by a group of employees moving from a previous existing firm. We study 
the prevalence and performance of spinoffs for Portugal from 1987 to 2008, while 
providing evidence that other firm restructuring activities such as mergers, acquisitions 
and changes in firm identifiers have increased in the same time span, both in magnitude 
and in relative terms. This suggests that the study of this kind of firm to firm relationship 
is a topic that deserves growing attention, and this characterization can contribute to that 
purpose.  
We use a probit model to estimate the probability of exit, to ascertain whether spinoffs 
have different exit patterns than comparable entrants, and how do they vary with the type 
of spinoff, while trying to understand what may cause that gap: the transference of 
industry specific knowledge, experience and shared routines as a team, and the 
opportunity cost faced by workers when creating the new venture are all factors that must 
be taken into consideration. 
We identify these operations using matched employer-employee data, where flows of 
groups of workers between firms are used to establish links between them, an approach 
that has been gaining popularity in the past decade, opening new possibilities and research 
applications.  
In the next section, we provide a review of the relevant literature and the hypothesis we 
want to address. This can be divided in the literature regarding the identification of firm 
links and literature that specifically concerns the determinants and performance of spinoff 
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firms. Section 3 provides details on the worker flow methodology and describes the 
prevalence and characteristics of spinoffs, mergers and acquisitions, changes in legal 
identifier and other operations involving significant flows of workers in Portugal. In 
section 4 a model of firm exit is used to compare the performance of spinoffs to those of 
other entrants, and assess whether they can be explained by other observed differences. 
In Section 5 we provide a discussion of our results in light of other studies of spinoff 
firms, while Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature and Hypothesis  
2.1 –Review of the worker flow approach and applications 
One limitation posed by the use of administrative data in the study of firms is that we 
cannot directly distinguish situations such as mergers and acquisitions, where at least one 
the firms disappears, from “true” exits. A similar situation can happen when one firm 
closes and reopens under a new name, or there is a mistake in the identifier of a firm. Not 
accounting for these situations can then overstate “true” entry and exit rates, as well as 
measures of job turnover, since workers involved in any of these operations will appear 
to have left a firm and entered a new one, while this is a result of a restructuring event 
happening in the same firm. Another issue is that we cannot directly link firms starting as 
spinoffs to firm of origin, distinguishing them from other entrants, which limits the study 
of this particular kind of firm. To overcome these problems, a new approach has emerged 
in recent years, which involves the use of information of workers flows across companies, 
from which links between firms may be established. While the methodology will be 
explained in more detail in section 3, it can be summarized as using the following idea: 
if one firm acquires another, the former will, in administrative terms, exit. However, 
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where do its workers go? One likely answer, in which this approach is based, is that the 
majority of them will move to the acquiring firm. Conversely, if we can observe that the 
founders of a new firm worked together at a previous existing one, we can classify it as a 
spinoff from that parent. As long as we know where someone is employed in a given year 
and to where he moves in the following, we can use this to identify links at the firm level. 
This kind of reasoning will be used in the next sections to identify and characterize firm 
transitions in the data, and to study in more detail spinoff entrants. For the identification 
of links between firms, the work we will most closely follow is that of Benedetto et al. 
(2007). They apply their approach to US data and focus particularly on the study of 
outsourcing activities. The motivation to study this industry is that, when a firm 
outsources a particular activity to other, the latter may have incentives to hire employees 
who previously worked in the former, and who have accumulated experience there. Other 
studies can be found for Belgium, where Gerts et al. (2009) compare entry and exit 
measures with and without correcting the data with worker data, and provide evidence of 
the impact that ignoring this can have on computing establishment entry and exit 
statistics. Similar results are found for Germany (Hethey and Schmieder (2013)). For 
Austria, Fink et al. (2010) compare information obtained under this approach with other 
sources of business statistics, concluding that the results are reliable. While the previous 
studies contribute for validating the use of this approach, the ones closest to the purpose 
of this thesis use this information to study entry of spinoffs and the characteristics 
affecting its performance, which will be discussed below.     
2.2 – The determinants and performance of spinoffs 
Spinoff firms are a particular kind of entrant. What distinguishes them from other firms 
that enter an industry is that they were a part of a previously existing firm. Whether this 
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can have beneficial effects on the performance of the entrant or, rather, constitute a 
liability, as well as the reasons that can explain possible differences to other entrants, is 
not certain. We provide below a synthesis of the main hypothesis present in the literature, 
with a particular focus on the ones we will try to test in our sample.  
One key distinction that is common in the literature is that between a “pushed” and a 
“pulled” spinoff (Eriksson and Kuhn (2006), Hethey and Schmieder (2013)). We denote 
by pushed spinoff one in which the parent firm disappears, while for the pulled spinoff it 
remains in existence. A pushed spinoff is more likely to reflect a situation in which a part 
of the workers of a closing firm founded a new one due to a low opportunity cost, resulting 
from the fact that they would not be able to remain employed in the parent firm. In what 
concerns pulled spinoffs, they are more likely to reflect situations in which the workers 
left the firm, not because they were forced by its closing, but rather because they 
considered they would be better off by moving to a new entrant. To the extent that a pulled 
spinoff can result from self-selection from workers with higher ability, it should perform 
better than other start-ups (Cabral and Wang (2009)). Using a different reasoning, where 
firms have a limited amount of ideas they can develop internally, and employees may 
start spinoffs when their ideas are rejected by the firm, Cassiman and Ueda (2006), also 
argue that pulled spinoffs should perform better than comparable start-ups. Here, this 
results from the assumption that better firms produce better ideas, so ideas rejected by 
those firms should on average be better, which leads the performance of the spinoff to be 
positively correlated with that of the mother firm. This model also suggests that this will 
be particularly relevant for ideas outside the core area of the predecessor, ideas which he 
will be less likely to follow. Given that there are contradictory explanations on whether 
spinoffs follow ideas close to those of its parents, we do not establish a specific hypothesis 
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for this factor. Klepper (2007) reviews several stylized facts related to the performance 
of spinoffs, where the evidence points to a better performance of spinoffs from better 
performing firms. In particular, studies on the population of Brazilian (Muendler et al. 
(2012)), Danish (Eriksson and Kuhn (2007) and Dahl and Reichstein (2007)) and Swedish 
firms (Andersson and Klepper (2013)) suggest that, from the three groups, pulled spinoffs 
survive longer. With the exception of Dahl and Reicshtein (2007), pushed spinoffs also 
tend to perform better than other start-ups. Given both the theoretical arguments and the 
empirical evidence, we expect that pulled spinoffs have the lowest exit risks across all 
entrant types. Regarding pushed spinoffs, the predictions are not so clear. To the extent 
that spinoff performance is correlated with the performance of the mother firm, as 
hypothesized above, we expect pushed spinoffs to perform worse than the pulled spinoffs. 
However, we do not have a clear prediction on how they compare with other entrants. In 
fact, it is possible that factors such as the experience of its founders, both in an industry 
and as a group, prevail over the fact that they came from a dying firm. 
Becky & Okhuysen (2009) provide a review of the theory on coordination between 
members of a group in an organization, and also point that one of the factors that enhances 
performance is the familiarity between group members, and point that it is usually 
considered that this familiarity tends to increase performance. Philips (2002), using data 
for Silicon Valley law firms, finds evidence that this knowledge can be transferable across 
firms, with an additional hypothesis being that it also depends on the rank of the workers 
in the parent firm. While this suggests that the increase in group experience should 
increase the performance of the spinoff, there is a possible objection: to the extent that a 
pulled spinoff may result from self-selection of the most able workers, a higher 
experience can result from the fact that they took longer in the decision create a new firm 
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and this lower propensity to spinoff may be negatively correlated with their skills, in 
which case group experience could have a negative effect on the success of spinoff 
entrants. Given this, we do not have a clear prediction for the effect of this on 
performance. In the particular case of pushed spinoffs this has an additional interpretation: 
a positive effect of experience on performance could mean that the benefits of mutual 
trust and coordination overweight eventual bad routines that could have led the mother 
firm to failure.   
3. Methodology  
3.1 – The Database “Quadros de Pessoal”   
The data used in this work is from Quadros de Pessoal, consisting on three interconnected 
sets of files: for each year, we have information available for every worker, for the 
establishment where he works, and for the firm the establishment belongs. For this 
analysis, we only considered information at the worker and firm levels. This avoids that 
transitions of workers across establishments in the same firm are interpreted as firm to 
firm relationships. The period used in the analysis ranges from 1986 to 2009. There is no 
worker file for the years of 1990 and 2001, so we cannot identify transitions in those years 
and the ones immediately after. For those years, we are only using firm level information, 
which will still be useful in the analysis of firm performance. 
3.2 – Identification of links across companies 
The first issue that arises when using this kind of data to study mergers and spinoffs is 
that they are not directly identified. To overcome this problem, we closely follow the 
work flow approach first proposed by Benedetto et al. (2007). The basis for this approach 
is that labor is a significant share of a firm's production factors. If we follow transitions 
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of labor across firms, it may be possible to derive meaningful interpretations regarding 
links between those firms. 
To simplify the analysis, we keep only one observation for each worker per year, 
corresponding to the company where he worked the most hours. For each worker and 
year, we identify the company where he worked in the previous year and the company 
where he worked in the following year. For each firm and year, we group all the workers 
who came from the same firm in the previous year and do the same for those who went 
to the same firm in the following year, excluding those who did not move across 
companies. From here, we create two separate panels, one for potential predecessors – 
firms of origin of a cluster of workers – and another for potential successors – firms that 
received a cluster of workers – acknowledging that these two categories may overlap, 
whenever there are workers entering and exiting the firm in the same year. Each 
observation in these panels is unique in terms of year, cluster in analysis and the identifier 
of the successor or predecessor, respectively. Merging these two panels means that each 
observation will now correspond to a potential link between two firm identifiers. The next 
step is to discuss how to classify those links. 
3.3 – Interpreting the links between firm identifiers 
Once the links are found, it is important to establish criteria for their classification. This 
is done according to the relative size of the cluster in analysis, when compared with the 
number of workers in each of the firms involved. To avoid misinterpreting usual labor 
market flows as decisions with an impact at a firm level, a minimum absolute size of five 
workers for the cluster in transition is defined, following Benedetto et al. (2007). In 
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addition, we exclude transitions observed from 2008 to 20091. This leaves us with 46639 
observations. To interpret those links, we need further assumptions regarding the relative 
size of the cluster, when compared to the number of workers in each company. When a 
merger or acquisition happens between two firms, we would expect one of two situations: 
Either the identifiers of the two firms disappear and a new one is created, or one of them 
disappears and the other represents the joint firm, with most of the workers of both firms 
in it. Conversely, for a spinoff, we expect that a relatively small share of the workers who 
were at the predecessor move to the new firm in the subsequent year, where they represent 
a large share of the work force. Given this, we follow once again Benedetto et al. (2007) 
criteria and establish two workforce conditions, regarding the relative size of the cluster 
of workers to each firm: 
Predecessor workforce condition: The cluster represents at least 80% of employment 
at the predecessor in the year before the transition; 
Successor workforce condition: The cluster represents at least 80% of employment at 
the successor in the year after the transition. 
Given this, there are four possible combinations, which are summarized in Table 1 along 




                                                 
1 Although we are able to identify transitions for this period, the econometric model used in section 4 
implies that we exclude the last year from the sample, so they were omitted for comparison purposes.  
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Table 1 – Classification according to workforce conditions 
 At least 80% of the workforce 
comes from the predecessor 
Less than 80% of the 
workforce comes from the 
predecessor 
At least 80% of the workforce 
moves to the successor 
Rename 
3776 (8.10%) 
Merger or Acquisition 
4790 (10.27%) 
Less than 80% of the workforce 






Spinoffs are the category of major interest for this thesis. As depicted in the table, they 
are verified when most of the workforce of a firm in a given year represented a relatively 
small share of labor that the predecessor firm was employing in the year before. 
Regarding the other categories, a merger or acquisition happens when two firms, here 
represented by the majority of their workforce, join into a new one, so that each of them, 
individually, corresponds to less than 80% of the workforce at the new firm. Renames 
can happen when firms change their identifier due to ownership changes that do not 
involve acquisition by another firm or changes in the legal form of a firm, where the latter 
represents roughly 50% of the operations in this category. Firms can also shut down due 
to other legal issues and reopen under a new name, keeping the production structure 
relatively similar, or there may be a mistake in the firm identifier. Since the production 
structure remains similar, we may not want to consider this as an entrant. Finally, when 
the cluster in analysis has a significant magnitude of at least five workers, but they do not 
represent a large share of either company, it may be harder to derive a meaningful 
interpretation for the transition. A possible reason for firms to be labeled as “Reason 
Unclear” is the outsourcing of activities from one firm to another.  
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Additionally, these categories can be refined according to conditions at the firm level, 
which tell us whether the predecessor leaves after the transition and whether the successor 
is an entrant. This means that, for each cell in Table 1, there are four possible subdivisions. 
To acknowledge for the fact that a firm may leave a small set of workers to deal with 
administrative tasks before exiting and, similarly, an entrant may hire a small set of 
workers to for those reasons (Benedetto et al. (2007); Pivetz et al. (2001)), the following 
conditions are used to identify whether the predecessor exits and the successor is an 
entrant, respectively:  
Predecessor exiting condition: number of workers after the transition corresponds to 
less than 10% of the workforce in the year before and is composed by less than five 
workers, or identifier is no longer in the database in that year; 
Successor entering condition: number of workers before the transition corresponds to 
less than 10% of the workforce in the year of the transition and is composed by less than 
five workers, or the identifier was not in the database in that year. 
Although the last two conditions are not used in the definition of the different categories, 
they can help us to refine the previous classification by separating, within each category, 
situations that may have different interpretations or reliability levels. As an extreme case, 
a change in identifier in which either the predecessor firm keeps in operation or the 
successor already existed is likely to result from incorrect criteria or mistakes in the data. 
For spinoffs, this allows us to distinguish situations in which the mother firm disappears, 
the pushed spinoffs mentioned before from those where it continues, the pulled spinoffs. 
Similarly, we would expect that at least one of the firms involved in a merger or 
acquisition disappears, so when this does not happen we cannot be that confident about 
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that classification. Although this can translate a partial acquisition, the fact that the 
threshold of 80% is chosen to translate the majority of a firm suggests that this should not 
be verified. Table 2 summarizes the results with the additional firm categories.  
Table 2 – Classification including firm conditions  


































































        



















































As seen, most of the observations lie where we would expect them to, with the categories 
that we described as being less likely representing only a small share of the total of 
transitions in analysis. We make an additional division, relatively to the classification 
presented above, regarding whether the companies involved in a merger or acquisition or 
spinoffs were in the same industry, measured by the highest division level of the industry 
classification code. For mergers and acquisitions, this allow us to distinguish between 
horizontal operations, involving firms in the same industry, from vertical mergers and 
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conglomerates. We find that approximately 60% of the mergers or acquisitions we 
identified are horizontal operations, and this share is constant across the period in 
analysis.  For spinoffs, this will be used to test some of the ideas presented in the previous 
section. 
3.4 – Overview of Mergers and Spinoffs in Portugal 
It is important to have an idea of the evolution of these operations across the years. Table 
3 shows that there has been a growth in the number of such operations across time. Since 
the total number of firms has also increased in the period in analysis, this alone could be 
explaining the growth pattern. Figure 1 shows that this does not seem to be the case, since 
the proportion to all new entrants with over five employees also increased over the same 
period. The fact that there is an increasing trend in both the spinoffs and mergers or 
acquisitions series suggests that these kind of restructuring activity has been gaining more 
relevance over time, even in relative terms. 
Table 3 – Evolution of Cluster Transitions over time 
 1987-1989 1992-19942 1995-1997 1998-2000 2003-2005 2006-2008 Total 
 
Mergers or Acquisitions 428 535 622 866 1061 1278 4790 
Pulled Spinoffs 170 302 301 351 432 484 2040 
Pushed Spinoffs 206 290 228 348 422 586 2062 
Renames 377 428 456 784 800 931 3776 
Reason Unclear 2850 4806 4223 5508 6365 10219 33971 
Total 4031 6361 5830 7857 9080 13480 46639 
 
                                                 
2 Until 1993 the survey was collected in March. From 1994 on it was collected in October. Given this, this 
column corresponds to a period of 3 years and 7 months.  
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Figure 1 – Transitions as share of total entry3 
 
Additionally, the size distribution of predecessor and successor firms is in Tables A.1 and 
A.2, showing that this approach can be used to study firms of different class sizes.  
Another factor of interest regards the geographical patterns of these transitions. Table 
A.3, in Appendix, gives information on how many transitions in each category involve 
changes in region, both at the municipality and district levels. Additionally, to account 
for situations in which the municipalities are too close, so that the interpretations 
mentioned above are most likely irrelevant, we also report numbers where only transitions 
involving firms whose respective council centers are more than 40 km apart, measured in 
straight line, are accounted as changing council or district. Less than 10% of the 
transitions of either pulled and push spinoffs, mergers and acquisitions involve changes 
over this threshold. It is unlikely that those changes in location, particularly the ones 
                                                 
3 The values are measured as 3 year moving averages of the respective categories, divided by total entry in 












1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Rename Merger or Acquisition Pushed Spinoff Pulled Spinoff
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involving longer distances, translate situations in which the workers actually moved to 
the other region, since we are considering a minimum of five workers for our analysis. In 
fact, for mergers and acquisitions, they are more likely to represent situations in which 
firms use inorganic growth to expand to other geographical markets, instead of 
consolidating their presence on their own region. For pulled spinoffs, this can mean that 
part of the employees from firms that operate in different places may decide that they 
have more knowledge about their specific geographical market and are better off from 
separating from the mother firm to retain the benefits of that knowledge. It can also 
translate situations in which a firm decides to exit a market and their employees from that 
specific market decide to occupy the place left by the parent by creating their own venture. 
The numbers suggest that, while consolidation in the same market seems to me more 
relevant for determining the decision of firms to engage on such operations, these changes 
in location are a motivation that should not be disregarded.  
4. The Survival of Spinoffs 
The main question we want to address is whether having entered the market as a spinoff 
is determinant to firm performance, for firms similar in other observed characteristics. 
We include in our analysis firms with at least five employees in the year of entry, 
excluding those founded in 1990, 1991, 2001 and 2002, since for those years we are not 
able to tell spinoffs from other entrants. Our measure of performance is exit: we want to 
know what influences the probability that a firm exits in a given year, so we can know 
whether the type of entry is determinant for this, or just a matter of different sample 
compositions. To observe exit in a given year, we need to observe whether the firm is in 
the database in the subsequent year. This implies excluding the year of 2009, since we 
would not be able to tell whether a firm exited in the last year of observations. One last 
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control is to exclude every firm that exited as a merger or acquisition, rename or reason 
unclear since, for the reasons discussed in the previous sections, if the firm exited in one 
of those ways, exiting may translate reasons other than failure, which is what we want to 
capture in our model. 
 Table 4 presents the unconditional survival patterns of the firms in each group.  The 
survival rate is defined as the share of firms that survived until a given age, here defined 
as an interval, from those which we would be able to observe until that age. The hazard 
rate is defined as the probability that a firm exits at a given interval, knowing it survived 
until that interval.  
Table 4 – Unconditional Survival and Hazard Rates 
Age 
Number of Potential 





1-3 1983 87.39% 0.20 
4-6 1445 67.40% 0.17 
7-9 1038 55.49% 0.17 
10-12 869 46.03% 0.14 
13-16 653 39.97% 0.16 
17-21 271 32.47% 0.32 
Pulled Spinoffs 
1-3 1889 92.91% 0.15 
4-6 1448 77.35% 0.15 
7-9 1058 65.22% 0.15 
10-12 902 56.76% 0.14 
13-16 631 48.49% 0.14 
17-21 229 39.74% 0.11 
Other entrants 
1-3 78199 89.33% 0.20 
4-6 67725 70.54% 0.17 
7-9 56266 58.44% 0.16 
10-12 50968 49.85% 0.13 
13-16 37865 43.93% 0.15 
17-21 19269 36.29% 0,17 
 
Consistently with our hypothesis and the patterns found for Denmark and Sweden, pulled 
spinoffs have the higher survival and lower hazard rates from all the entrant types. 
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However, here pushed spinoffs have the lowest survival rates, which in Sweden is verified 
for the “Other entrants” category. Additionally, the convergence in hazard rates verified 
in the other countries may be verified in our sample until the 13-16. In fact, the hazard 
rate for pulled spinoffs starts at a value of 0.15 and remains relatively constant, while for 
the other groups it starts at a higher value and decreases to a similar magnitude. While 
there is a sharp decline in the hazard rate of pulled spinoffs in the last period (and rise in 
that of pushed spinoffs), this can result from the smaller sample in analysis.  
Our main question is on whether the differences between groups persist for firms similar 
in other observed characteristics, or can be attributed to the type of entry on itself. For 
this, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 in 
the year of exit. Table 5 summarizes our control variables, showing that some differ 
significantly across groups. In particular, pulled spinoffs have, on average, a larger size 
at entry and a more educated workforce.  
Table 5 - Average values of independent variables at entry 
 Pushed Spinoffs Pulled Spinoffs Other entrants 
Same industry as parent 0.59 0.39 0 (by definition) 
Median tenure in parent firm 6.36 7.35 0 (by definition) 
Percentile 75 of tenure in parent firm 9.27 10.65 0 (by definition)  
Average age of employees 37.04 37.61 33.59 
Average education level (in years of schooling) 6.56 7.54 6.73 
Employment 19.09 28.69 9.51 




The effect of entry type is captured by dummy variables for whether the firm entered as 
a pulled or pushed spinoff, with the base category being all other entrants with five or 
more employees.  
 To test whether the performance of a spinoff depends on the industry specific knowledge 
acquired at the previous firm or, on the other hand, spinoffs can be justified by a perceived 
opportunity that deviates from the parent’s core area of activity, we use a dummy variable 
for each type of spinoff, that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the same industry than the 
predecessor. 
 As a proxy for the experience that the workers have as a team and may transmit to the 
spinoff firm, we use the median tenure at the mother firm, for the workers that moved to 
the spinoff entrant. The choice of this variable assures that at least half of the team has 
been working in the same firm for a given amount of time. In our setting, this tests whether 
this coordination is limited to the scope of a firm, or transferrable as the team moves to 
create its own firm. To consider the hypothesis that the rank of the workers involved in a 
spinoff may also be relevant (Phillips (2002)) we also use the 75th in model (2).  
As a control for the human capital embodied in the firm, we use the mean education level 
of the workers, measured in years of schooling, in the year of entry. This accounts for 
possible differences in human capital across the two groups that could lead to differences 
in the exit rates. We also control for the mean age of the workers in a firm, which can 
work as a proxy for experience, allowing to distinguish the possible effect of experience 
in the predecessor from general working experience. We allow this variable to have a 
non-linear effect, by including a quadratic term.  
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As a measure of entry size, we use the logarithm of employment in the firm in the year of 
entry.  
All the variables discussed above are specified as being time invariant, i.e., we are 
measuring the characteristics of the firm in the year of entry. To see how the probability 
of exit evolves over time, we include the age of the firm and squared term, and interactions 
with both types of spinoff. Output from the estimation is presented below 











Due to the non-linear nature on the model, we cannot directly interpret the coefficients as 
marginal effects. However, we can infer on the sign of the effect of each variable.  
Dependent Variable: Exit                                          (1)            (2) 
Pushed Spinoff 0.059        (1.39) 
 
0.054   (1.24) 
Pulled Spinoff -0.232      (-5.32)*** 
 
-0.237  (-5.26)*** 
Same Industry×Pushed Spinoff 0.035       (0.95) 0.035    (0.96) 
Same Industry×Pulled Spinoff 0.227       (0.60) 0.023    (0.61) 
Median Tenure   
Median Tenure×Pushed Spinoff 
 
-0.007      (-2.15)**  
Median Tenure×Pulled Spinoff 
 
-0.001      (0.33)  
Percentile 75×Pushed Spinoff  -0.004   (-1.75)* 
Percentile 75×Pulled Spinoff  
 
-0.001    (0.49) 
Age  -0.483      (-29.49)*** -0.048   (-29.47)*** 
 
Age2 1.438       (14.41)*** 1.438    (-14.41)*** 
Age × Pushed Spinoff -0.167      (-1.53) -0.167   (-1.53) 
Age2 × Pushed Spinoff 1.210       (1.69)* 1.223    (1.71)* 
Age×Pulled Spinoff 0.430       (3.54)*** 0.430    (3.53)*** 
Age2 × Pulled Spinoff   -1.788      (-2.19)** -1.783   (-2.18)** 
   
Log-Likelihood -140120.74 -141750.79 
Number of  Observations 544279 544279 






The results above are consistent with the hypothesis that pulled spinoffs perform better 
than other firms. Within pulled spinoffs, however, there is apparently no effect on whether 
the spinoff diverts or not from the parent’s industry: the existence of industry specific 
knowledge does not seem a key explanation for their survival pattern.  
Regarding the pushed spinoffs, they do not differ significantly from the comparison 
group. Within pushed spinoffs, there is no evidence that those in the same industry as the 
parent have different exit risks than the others. While the other country level studies only 
control for whether the spinoff is in the same industry, not distinguishing between pushed 
and pulled operations for this purpose, their results show that being in the same industry 
has a positive effect on performance (although it dissipates over the years for Denmark 
(Eriksson and Kuhn (2006)). Our results do not support this hypothesis. 
Regarding the median tenure of the cluster of workers in the parent firm, we only find an 
effect for the pushed spinoffs, for which this variable has a negative and significant sign. 
The results on this regard are qualitatively similar for several choices of the percentile in 
analysis, besides the ones reported in (1) and (2). The results are robust to several other 
specifications non-reported here, including interactions of entrant type the size of the 
firm, with measuring firm size according to different classes and using dummies for the 
age of each entrant instead of a quadratic firm. Given this, we find no evidence that the 
team experience effects mentioned earlier are relevant for determining performance, at 
least when we control for other characteristics of the workforce like education and human 
capital.  
In our specification, we allow for a quadratic form on the effect of age of performance. 
In general, age decreases the probability of exit, and there is evidence that its effect is 
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non-linear. The effects on the interaction terms with each type of spinoff should be 
interpreted with care. The fact that the coefficients for the pushed spinoffs are barely 
significant, and smaller in magnitude than those for pulled spinoffs, means that there is 
no significant additional effect of age on pushed spinoffs, when compared to other 
entrants, which is consistent with the unconditional hazards described in table 5, where 
age reduces exit risks for both pushed spinoffs and the base group. Conversely, for pulled 
spinoffs the coefficients are significant and have a comparable magnitude but a different 
sign than the effect of age without interactions. This suggests that the overall effect for 
this type of entrant will be close to zero, which is consistent with the relatively constant 
hazard rates observed in the descriptive statistics.  
5. Discussion  
It is important to stress that our classification of spinoff differs from the other country 
level studies. While they consider entrants with between 2 to 10 employees, where only 
50% needs to come from the same firm, our sample includes larger firms, since we are 
considering firms with at least 5 workers and pose no upper limit on firm size. The main 
difference is that, in our sample, the decision to spinoff is more likely to result from 
interactions between the parent firm and its employees, since it will have a larger effect 
on the former, while they explicitly want to capture decisions made by workers. In fact, 
some operations that we classify as spinoffs are considered divestitures in their analysis. 
The fact that the main results are in line their studies, however, suggests that the difference 
perform of spinoffs will not be sensible to the definition. One advantage of our sample 
choice, is that it is more appropriate for the study of the hypothesis regarding the 
transference of coordination and routines across organizations.  
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The results obtained are in line with theories that suggest a better performance of spinoffs 
of better performing firms, both compared to other spinoffs and other startups. However, 
they do not allow us to strongly infer on whether that stems from industry specific 
knowledge or on pursuing ideas outside the core area of activity of the predecessor. In 
fact, if the forces that drive each of the hypothesis are present in our sample, none of them 
outweighs the other, so that there is no distinctive effect on whether a spinoff is or not in 
the same industry as its parent.  
The persistence of initial differences in exit risks seems to be smaller, if any, in our case 
than for Denmark (Eriksson and Kuhn (2006) and Sweden (Andersson and Klepper 
(2009)). In fact, the authors find that, contrary to the unconditional estimates where there 
seems to be a convergence in exit risks, pulled spinoffs actually increase the gap to other 
entrants, while the opposite happens in our case.  
Finally, one important hypothesis that we introduce in this context of country level studies 
is the possibility that, even after controlling for other determinants of experience and 
worker characteristics, the experience that the workers have together at the older firm 
may be relevant for performance. However, we only find weak evidence that, in the case 
of pushed spinoffs, this may have an effect on survival, suggesting that these kind of 
intangibles is not determinant for the performance of the spinoff. 
Conclusions 
The use of the worker flow methodology opens new possibilities in the study of firms 
using administrative data. It allow us to trace operations that would be, otherwise, hard 
to quantify, namely regarding the reasons that lead firms to enter or exit a market, or the 
ways in which they are growing. We employ this to the universe of Portuguese firms for 
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the period of 1987 to 2008 and provide evidence that they are used by a small, but non-
negligible, fraction of companies in our country. This assessment discusses the diverse 
events that the approach allow us to capture and shows that, within each of them, there is 
considerable heterogeneity regarding the scope of the operations. Firms may join forces 
for horizontal consolidation, acquire others in the same vertical chain or exploit the 
benefits or conglomerates. Similarly, when workers leave and found spinoffs those can 
be or not in the same industry. Finally, geographical information shows that roughly 10% 
of operations involve changes to a distant city which, added to the above motivations, 
shows that there are different drivers for these operations, each being a source of further 
study on itself.   
We study in more detail the survival of spinoff entrants, comparing it with other entrants. 
Our results are in line with the literature and, particularly other country level studies for 
Brazilian, Danish and Swedish firms, in that the reason for the spinoff to happen is 
determinant on its survival. In particular, pulled spinoffs, for which the parent survives, 
have lower exit risks than other start-ups. However, we do not find any difference on the 
performance of pushed spinoffs to other entrants. This evidence is suggested in terms of 
unconditional hazard rates, and persists after controlling for other factors through the use 
of regression analysis. We do not find industry specific factors to affect the performance 
of spinoff firms, and find only weak evidence that the benefits from previous having 
worked together may influence survival, for workers with comparable human capital. All 
in all, this suggests that the forces that drive the better performance of the pulled spinoffs 
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Table A.1 – Size of Predecessor firms, by category 









       
5-9 Employees 2244 2583 588 2184 140 
10-49 Employees 1329 1843 1205 12007 975 
50-249 Employees 171 304 209 8372 576 
250 or more Employees 32 60 60 11408 349 
 
Table A.2 – Size of Sucessor firms, by category 









       
5-9 Employees 2218 1082 1134 2233 1011 
10-49 Employees 1356 2456 802 12452 802 
50-249 Employees 172 867 103 8467 187 
250 or more Employees 30 385 23 10819 40 
 
Table A.3 – Operations involving changes in City or District 
 Merger or Acquisition Pushed Spinoff Pulled Spinoff 
Change in 
City 
All 926    356 517 






All 428 123 253 
More than 40km 363 89 189 
 
